CHAPTER 5

CONTEXT OF EDUCATION IN INDONESIA

In Chapter 5, I examine the political, cultural, and educational development of Indonesia since the early 20th century. I discuss the problem of ethnicity, Indonesia’s history, diversity versus uniformity, the demand for educational changes, and multiculturalism in Indonesia. In my discussion of diversity versus uniformity, I position myself as an Indonesian who has been shaped by my lived experiences and educational process at local, national, and global levels. Inspired by Ballengee-Morris and Stuhr (2001), I describe how social, cultural, and political complexities on these three levels influence an individual’s development. This investigation involves a narrative of my personal experiences, reflective journals, and email communications.

Although Indonesia has claimed to be democratic since 1945, it leans more toward an authoritarian government. Under the régimes of Sukarno and Suharto, nationalism legitimated uniformity, avoiding diversity and affirming homogeneity. I investigated multiculturalism in America not because America is a first world and a super power country that would serve as a model for Indonesia, but because diversity and

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3 See Contemporary music in Indonesia: Between local traditions, national obligations, and international influences by German scholar Dieter Mack (2004), in which he uses these three levels to investigate contemporary Indonesian music.
difference are an issue for both America and Indonesia, which affirms the need to promote multicultural education in both countries. Since the 1960s, American scholars have debated these issues, because democracy, which was already formally in place in the United States, was nonetheless still biased by unjust practices.

**Ethnic Groups and Ethnicity**

In the United States, proponents of multicultural education use the term ‘ethnic group’ to refer to a revival of immigrant sentiment (Banks, 1999; Bennett, 2003; and Gollnick & Chinn, 2006). In Indonesia, the English term ‘ethnic group’ is similar to the word *suku* (ethnicity), which refers to a unit smaller than a nation. This term was already used in Indonesia long before nation building was started.

A *suku* is determined by local language and *adat* (traditional customs and behavior), based on common descent from the ancestors where a community of people is located. In Indonesia, *suku*, *agama* (religion), *ras* (race), and *antargolongan* (groups or classes) make up the acronym *SARA*. Due to the Indonesian government’s attempt to realize ‘*visi keIndonesiaan*’ or ‘Indonesianness’, characterized by nationalism, *SARA* became politically a sensitive issue in public discussion. Yampolsky (1995) explains that “since ethnicity is generally not acknowledged by the Indonesian government, ‘regional’ often serves as a euphemism for ‘ethnic’” (p. 701). He discusses the ‘regional’ arts, in contrast to the ideas of ‘national culture’ when Indonesian nationalists debated Indonesia’s future culture. In order to be consistent with the terminology in this dissertation, the term *suku* or ‘ethnic group’ will be used to refer to ethnicity.
Indonesia consists of a large number of suku or ethnic groups with diverse origins. Many ethnic groups from the islands of Java, Bali, and Sumatra were influenced by Chinese culture, Indian Hinduism/Buddhism, Islam and its Arabic culture, as well as Christianity that was introduced during the European colonial expansion. Other large ethnic groups and some smaller ones that still live in remote areas of Kalimantan, Sumatra, Sulawesi, and Irian Jaya islands continue to maintain their ancestral traditions and languages without major external influences.

Indonesia consists of more than 350 ethnic groups with different languages and traditions, such as Sundanese, Betawi, Javanese, Maduranese, Balinese, Minang, Acehnese, Batak, Mentawai, Toraja, Asmat, Baduy, and others. Geographically, these suku live in rural and/or urban areas. In addition, there are small numbers of Chinese communities mostly located in urban areas all over Indonesia.

Indonesia is officially a unified country, despite the diversity of numerous ethnic groups with very different languages and customs within its borders. At the same time, none of the local languages dominate the national language. The new Indonesian national language used since the 1920s is mainly based on Malay, which was already the lingua franca in the trade centers all over the coastal areas for a long time. Malay was further enriched by elements from local languages, mainly Javanese, Sundanese, and Balinese, as well as foreign languages, including Dutch, Arabic, and English. The influence of local and foreign languages kept changing significantly over time. After Indonesia’s independence in 1945, this enriched language became a symbol of unity and the national language of Indonesia, called Bahasa Indonesia. Nevertheless, every ethnic group still
maintains and continues to use its respective local language, while Bahasa Indonesia is used in schools, in public, and to communicate with other ethnic groups. Every Indonesian citizen speaks at least two languages, his/her mother tongue and Bahasa Indonesia, except for young generations in urban areas that use only Bahasa Indonesia with a certain slang typical to teens.

An Overview of Indonesia’s History

Until 1945, the area that became Indonesia consisted mainly of feudal kingdoms and colonized areas. The whole archipelago of Indonesia has a complex history with differently developing civilizations. To write a short history of the present Indonesia is an almost impossible task, due to the fact that every ethnic group has its own historical background. It is also important to note that most of Indonesian history is not based on written documents (at least up to the 16th century), but on interpretations of buildings, monuments, carvings, and a few inscriptions.  

Some researchers examined Indonesian history by studying the performing arts. For example, James R. Brandon was an American researcher who studied performing arts in Southeast Asia. To determine the cultural development of Southeast Asia, he outlined four time periods: (1) pre-history between 2500 B.C. and 100 A.D., (2) between 100 and 1000 when Indian influences came, (3) between 1300 and 1750 when Islam influences came, (4) from 1750 to the end of World War II (Brandon, 1967). According to Soedarsono (1977, 2002), an Indonesian researcher for performing arts, the cultural

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The cultural and political development of the main ethnic groups in Indonesia was gradually signified by acculturation with foreign influences. Indian Hinduism and Buddhism had the strongest influence on various ethnic groups, mainly on the islands of Sumatra, Java, and Bali, creating some feudal kingdoms since about the 5th/6th centuries. These influences finally created impressive constructions in Central Java around the 9th and 11th centuries, such as the Buddhist temple Borobodur and the Hindu temple Prambanan. While Buddhist and Hindu influences were mostly felt on the mainland, coastal areas also came in contact with other cultures, especially the famous worldwide traders from the Chinese, Arab, and Persian worlds. The Straits of Malacca were the main route for all shippings. At the same time, especially on the East coast of Sumatra and the North coast of Java and Bali, harbours were situated and had been trade centers for centuries. Chinese influence can still be seen clearly, for example, in the ornamentations of Hindu temples in Northern Bali, the ornamentations of silk and cotton, and in the
design of porcelains that decorate the historical buildings of the Cirebon Kingdoms in West Java.

The 14th century is generally regarded as the ‘Golden Age,’ represented by the great Hindu Kingdom of Majapahit located in East Java. The Hindu Majapahit Kingdom succeeded in building a nation of islands, becoming the center of all smaller kingdoms around for some time. During the era of the Hindu Majapahit Kingdom, the dance theatre forms called raket and the masked dance drama were highly developed. Hayam Wuruk, one of the kings in the 14th century, and his father frequently participated in raket performances (Soedarsono, 1990). Later, parallel to the decline of the Hindu Majapahit Kingdom and its breaking-up into various smaller kingdoms, Islamic influence became increasingly evident. There had always been contact with the Islamic world via the traders; but then, Islamic preachers became active, spreading Islam. According to the hierarchical organization of the society, Muslim preachers always began by convincing the leader first during their missionizing activities. Naturally, when the leader would convert to the new religion, all people in his realm would automatically follow his faith. Therefore, Islamization in Java was no complicated task. However, according to Ramseyer (1977), a few Hindu nobles, craftsmen, and artists who did not want to convert to Islam emigrated to Bali. Thus, Bali gradually became a stronghold for the Hindu region in the whole archipelago, where a special Balinese form of Hinduism continues today.

In the 16th and 17th centuries Java experienced the famous Mataram Kingdom in Central Java and the North coast kingdoms of Pajang, Demak, Tuban, and Cirebon.
Particularly in the Mataram Kingdom, the performing arts, such as *gamelan* (metal orchestra), *wayang wong* (dance drama), *wayang* (shadow puppet play), and various dance forms were developed and became highly stylized forms. Even though Mataram was an Islamic Kingdom, until the early 20th century the kings still strongly held onto Hindu concepts. For example, the King of Mataram used the *wayang wong* performance to legitimate his authority that he represented Vishnu, one of the three main deities in the Hindu faith, to preserve the world (Soedarsono, 1990).

According to Brakel (1995), “when Islam became a world religion, Indonesia had long been a part of the international trade network. An ever-growing number of Muslim traders began to participate in this trade network and landed on the coasts of Indonesia” (p. 2). Muslim traders from India, such as Gujarat and Bengal and gradually from Persia and Arabia spread the faith of Islam actively throughout Indonesia.

When we examine the example of the beliefs of the King of Mataram, we can see that Islam in Indonesia blended with the ancient indigenous religions, namely Hinduism, Buddhism, and even other animistic traditions. These religions firmly integrated their belief systems into dance, music, and theatre. Great Muslim masters used the performing arts, such as *gamelan* (metal music orchestra), *wayang* (shadow puppet), or *wayang topeng* (masked dance drama) as a means to attract followers to their spiritual teachings (Soedarsono, 1990). Thus, Islam in Indonesia became a religion of the people from all classes.

During the seventeenth century, the early Dutch colonial settlements were motivated by economic interests and only later in the 19th century by more imperialistic
motives (Mack, 2004; Nasution, 1995). Step by step, the Dutch colonizers tried to establish new trade centers, first in coastal areas and then further inland and into mountain areas of the various islands. One of the main strategies of the colonizers was to collaborate with the respective local kings and nobles. The nobles traditionally received a certain percentage of the harvest of their people, which had been the practice over many centuries. Thus, the Dutch did not interfere with the indigenous people. They appointed the nobles as their local representatives, thereby exploiting the peasants without officially being perceived as the “bad guys” or colonizers. While this strategy worked almost everywhere, Bali became the last center of resistance for the Dutch. Only in 1908, and in connection with the famous mass suicide (puputan Badung) of the local king with all his people in front of the Dutch army, did the Balinese courts also surrender (Vickers, 1989).

The term ‘Indonesia’ was first used in the name of an organization, namely, the Indonesian Alliance of Students in the Netherlands in the 1920s. This organization was founded by the Indonesian youth who raised a strong national, patriotic consciousness against the Dutch colonizers (Nasution, 1995). In October 1928, the Indonesian youth, including women’s clubs, labor unions, and groups from different ethnic, linguistic, religious, and cultural backgrounds, became the supporters of the growth of a national consciousness. This was represented by the statement, Sumpah Pemuda meaning Youth Oath: One Nation, Indonesia; One Country, Indonesia; One Language, Bahasa Indonesia.

The women’s movement in Indonesia, which confronted the traditional Javanese concept of a woman as only a domestic entity, coincided with the growth of the national youth movement. On December 22, 1928, Indonesian women held a congress in
Yogyakarta, which served as an occasion for the unification of the Indonesian Women’s Movement for the first time. Thereby, the 22\textsuperscript{nd} of December was proclaimed as ‘The Day of Women’s Awakening’ in Indonesia. According to the Indonesian newspaper 	extit{Suara Rakyat} in Surabaya (16 May 1953), “before the historic day the various women’s organizations were inserted only in general advancement, but beginning December 22, 1928, the Women of Indonesia, fully conscious of their responsibilities, merged their movement with the national struggle” (tr. Geertz, 1971, p. 368). In other words, since 1928, the women of Indonesia had equal rights with men in confronting the colonizers.

After many battles and political turmoil by those patriotic Indonesians who confronted the Dutch and later the Japanese colonizers (1942-1945), Indonesia proclaimed its independence in 1945. The leading Indonesian nationalists then tried to restructure the state to build self-governance and unify the diverse ethnic groups throughout the archipelago. Indonesian leaders used the concept of \textit{Pancasila} (Five Principles) as state ideology to promote an Indonesian type of democracy, along with the national credo \textit{Binneka Tunggal Ika} (Unity in Diversity). \textit{Pancasila} contains five principles: (1) belief in the one supreme God, (2) just and civilized humanity, (3) the unity of Indonesia, (4) consultative democracy, and (5) social justice.

In the mid 1950s, after a decade of independence, the spirit of unity and the democratic phase of Indonesia ended or even failed. Internally, the state became weak as a result of regional instability and conflict between the elites and various armed resistance groups (Alatas, 1997). The first Indonesian President, Sukarno, who was elected as a life-long president, developed the concept of ‘Guided Democracy.’ This, in
reality, meant authoritarianism and no freedom for the people. ‘Guided Democracy’ occurred because Sukarno was impatient with party politics. He proclaimed a lifelong presidency and controlled the parties so that they had no freedom. As a matter of fact, the so-called ‘Guided Democracy’ was a mere disguise of an authoritarian attitude. Along with ‘Guided Democracy,’ Sukarno also incorporated communist, Hindu, and Islamic principles into secular nationalism.

In reaction to the oppressive authoritarian regime, anti-communist movements began in the late 1950s, with everything culminating in a disastrous coup in 1965. Following the coup, General Suharto took over the state and formally became President in 1967. From the beginning, he used strong military force to rule the country with an iron grip that he called ‘the New Order.’ Like Sukarno’s ‘Guided Democracy,’ Suharto soon turned into an autocratic leader, as well.

Diversity versus Uniformity: A Personal Context of Indonesian Education

My own elementary education was in the 1970s in West Java, when the Indonesian government reigned under the New Order ideology, and General Suharto was the president of the Republic of Indonesia. According to Bjork (2005), “in Javanese society, before and after independence, the state has been defined hierarchically, with power resting at the top” (p. 2). This hierarchical system was probably due to the legacy of feudal kingdoms that have already existed since the pre-colonial period. Suharto led the country with his long-term plans Rencana Pembangunan Lima Tahun (Five-Year Strategy Plans) that focused on nation-building, favoring a techno-economic development
of Western style. He used the military as a vehicle to manage extremely diverse ethnic
groups. Furthermore, Suharto legitimated ‘nationalism’ as a power of ‘unity in diversity’
to establish the Indonesian national identity, and the term ‘national’ became powerful in
forming uniformity and sameness.

Beginning with Suharto’s presidency, all Indonesian children have been mandated
to go to school. The schools attempted to build a spirit of nationalism affirming
uniformity. I attended elementary and secondary schools in Majalengka in West Java,
which is culturally Cirebonese. Cirebon, a North Java coastal area, is located at the
border between West Java and Central Java. Here, people speak a mixed dialect of
Javanese and Sundanese languages. Every day I went to school wearing a uniform. Every
Monday morning I attended the school’s ‘ritual’ ceremonies, where all students, teachers,
and staff had to sing the national anthem, Indonesia Raya, and other national patriotic
songs while we raised the Indonesian flag. We also had to recite the five state principles,
Pancasila, and the youth oath, Sumpah Pemuda. All public schools in Indonesia were
mandated to follow a military act similar to the one during the three-year Japanese
colonial era before independence in 1945. Yet, the school system and its rituals were only
manifestations of the political system that attempted to “cultivate the spirit of patriotism”
(Bjork, 2005, p. 47).

My classmates were ethnically homogeneous and heterogeneous. In elementary
school in the village of Parakan, my classmates were more homogeneous in terms of
language and religion. As in most rural schools in Indonesia, we spoke the local language
in daily life as our mother tongue. Islam was our main religion, even though in the daily
practice of my community it was still a syncretistic belief, with a blend of Islam, animism, Hinduism, and Buddhism. When I was enrolled in middle school in the sub-district of Leuwimunding, my classmates were more heterogenous in terms of language. Some spoke Cirebonese and others spoke Sundanese. However, we had no problems communicating, because we were required to speak the national language, Bahasa Indonesia in school.

When I attended high school, I lived in the central bureaucracy district of Majalengka, one hour away from my home for three years. This was the only high school available in the area, requiring me to commute to school every week. The district of Majalengka is like a mixture of rural and urban settings. Geertz (1965) explains that the urban setting maintains the basics of social structural elements of bureaucracy, village, and market, while the rural setting maintains the plantation structure. In high school, I had my first experience of religious diversity. For example, I had Chinese friends, who were Christian or Buddhist. Religion was taught in segregated classes. I did not question this practice, but accepted it as normal. In terms of friendships, I had no problems with students of different beliefs.

Most of my classmates in elementary school and middle school did not go on to high school because high school was too costly for them. Students had to pay tuition, books, and other supplies. Since the high school was out of town, they had to pay for transportation and living expenses, which most families could not afford. Students who did not continue on to high school did not stay in the plantations to work with their
parents, but often went to work in the capital city Jakarta, hoping to find a better life. I was fortunate to have an opportunity to continue studying in a public high school.

My early experience in dance was in an extracurricular program and in the community. In elementary and middle school, as part of the arts, I learned drawing and national patriotic songs rooted in tonal Western music. In elementary school, these were taught by a classroom teacher, while in middle school the arts were taught by specialists. Dance was offered only as an extracurricular activity with a small number of students who were really interested in learning dance. Nevertheless, I learned a lot about dance from watching many performances in the community because the traditional performing arts still existed in Indonesia in the 1970s when I was in elementary school.

For example, groups of mask dances and shadow puppet plays were always invited to perform by the communities in rural areas for any kind of ritual and social events, such as harvest ceremonies, weddings, and circumcision celebrations. These communities believed (and still do so) that those performing arts have the power and spirit of the good and the evil in connection with the village ancestors and Dewi Sri, the rice goddess. Most agricultural societies from Indonesia believe in Dewi Sri as a goddess whose spirit protects the rice fields and the harvesting process as a whole. The more ceremonies the communities had, the more I was able to experience a vast variety of performances. In fact, it was those early experiences in dance that inspired me to enter the Indonesian Academy of Dance (Akademi Seni Tari Indonesia [ASTI]) in Bandung, the capital city of West Java.
In the 1980s I emigrated to Bandung to study dance in ASTI that was part of the dance academy in Yogyakarta, Central Java. The ASTI in Bandung aimed to preserve and develop the cultural heritage of Sundanese dance, music, and theater. After I graduated from a three-year diploma program in Bandung, I took an undergraduate degree at the Indonesian Academy of Music in Surakarta/Solo, Central Java. The program was a collaborative effort between the two schools, as some courses took place in Solo and some in Bandung. The ASTI in Bandung also collaborated with centers of foreign cultures, such as the French Cultural Center (CCF) and the German Goethe Institute. At this school I had the opportunity to interact with people from different ethnic backgrounds and nationalities. There, in addition to learning choreography, I studied the rich heritage of Indonesian dances, mainly Sundanese, Javanese, and Balinese forms.

While I studied in Bandung and Solo, I was involved in many cultural activities, such as seminars, workshops, and performances in Taman Ismail Marzuki (TIM) in Jakarta. TIM was mainly conceived to promote the ‘preservation and revitalization’ efforts of traditional Indonesian art forms and to develop the new concepts and values of Indonesia’s avant garde in the arts. TIM became a center of interactive partnership of various cultures or ethnic groups in Indonesia. During the 1990s and 2000s, TIM also became a center of collaborative exchange between Indonesian artists and their counterparts from Germany, the United States, Australia, India, and others. Two main international activities were the triennial Art Summit Indonesia starting in 1995, and the biennial Indonesian Dance Festival (IDF) starting in 1992. One of the leading topics discussed by Indonesian dance scholars was about national dances.
The term ‘national dance’ was based on the ideas of some nationalists who were concerned with the proper character of Indonesian’s future culture. The educator Ki Hadjar Dewantara (1950) argued that “Indonesian [national] culture already exists, if we accept as the culture of the Indonesian nation all the cultures that now are found in the regions of all the islands of Indonesia” (cf. Yampolsky, 1995: 703). In this case, dances from an ethnic group are part of Indonesia’s national culture. However, Sukarno, who was the first President of the Republic of Indonesia from 1945 to 1965 and a thorough nationalist, interpreted national dances simply as movement techniques of folk dances presented in a short performance. He also supported the ideas of national dance to combine some movement elements from various ethnic dances. Sukarno’s ideas affected some Javanese choreographers who created national dances through combining a mixture of elements from many ethnic dances or adopting folk dances from certain ethnic groups. Fortunately, many prominent dancers who had firmly classical dance backgrounds refused to create so-called national dances. Instead, they established and developed these dance forms of various ethnic groups in the educational system, mainly at art academies, thereby preserving them.

In contrast to the communities in the 1970s, communities in the 1980s in rural areas undertook various modernization processes which caused significant social and cultural changes, including a lot of serious tensions and problems. Many people in the villages had television, so they enjoyed watching a movie rather than going to the traditional theater. The communities rarely invited the traditional performing arts, but they used films or just a tape recorder at their ceremonies. The traditional theater in my
village which used to be sold out every weekend in the 1970s, was finally replaced by the movies. In schools, students learned music and fine arts, which adopted Western theories, in order to match national targets. People who migrated to the cities often returned to their villages for holidays and the Idul Fitri (Eid) celebration, bringing back to the village new lifestyles and symbols of urban culture like pop music and popular dance, similar to America’s hip-hop. The cultural exchange between rural and urban cultures was represented by a mixture of traditional performing arts, mask dance, and pop music. Under these circumstances, students did not have opportunities to learn local performing or visual arts, and the richness of Indonesian cultures represented in dance, music, and theater gradually diminished.

In the 1990s, I became a dance teacher and researcher at the Institute of Teacher Training and Educational Sciences or Indonesia University of Education (UPI) in Bandung, which launched the Department of Dance and Music in 1987 to train dance and music teachers. At UPI, I worked collaboratively with Sundanese, Javanese, Minang, and a German colleague, Dieter Mack. We were concerned with the change in schools from traditional dance to popular ones, and the dominance of Western music theory instead of indigenous Indonesian forms. When I worked on my master’s degree in Gadjah Mada University in Yogyakarta between 1994 and 1996, I researched the biography of the mask dancer Sawitri in Losari, Cirebon. Since 1996, some faculty members at UPI, Dieter Mack, and myself have been conducting research to document the traditional performing
arts in Indonesia and to develop teaching materials for music and dance teachers. This project was funded by the Ford Foundation.

While teaching at UPI, I became one of the national curriculum planners for arts education in 2000 and an assessor for accreditation of the arts programs between 1999 and 2001. Even though dance is still an isolated subject in Indonesian schools, some elementary and middle schools have a dance class for 80 or 90 minutes per week, either as a core subject or as a local content curriculum (LCC). LCC was impacted by the changes in the educational policy of Wardiman Djojonegoro, the new Minister for National Education (1993-1998).

Djojonegoro belonged to a group of German-educated scientists and engineers in the tradition of Bacharuddin Jusuf Habibie, the minister for Science and Technology at that time. He began his work by promoting the slogan ‘link and match’ in 1994. Mack (2001), a German guest music professor at UPI since 1991, explained that the ‘link and match’ policy was the attempt to adapt the German system of linking education with the industry. Mack argued that in the German non-academic educational system, a student will have a combined curriculum between school education and practical apprenticeship in a certain industry. Furthermore, according to Mack, Djojonegoro was convinced that this combination, that ‘link’ which has been successful in Germany, would also ‘match’ in Indonesia, in order to support the industrial growth and prosperity of the country. As a matter of fact, Djojonegoro’s idea failed almost completely, not because of his policy and attempts at implementation, but because of a complete disregard by the industrial leaders who saw only their economic success, including exploiting their workers. The idea that
they also have a responsibility in education that finally would benefit their institutions was not accepted at all.

On an academic level, Djojonegoro’s policy led to a considerable change in higher education. The natural sciences received a significant increase in the curriculum, while especially arts education was cut back. In order to support this change on a national level, Djojonegoro proposed the so-called local content curriculum (LCC, *kurikulum muatan lokal*). It was mainly thought to give the provinces a kind of autonomy in deciding what materials to use in the classroom, as there was no defined content by the central government.

In official statements, Djojonegoro explained that the LCC could especially be used for local arts education. However, in reality, most provinces used the LCC for other interests like the English language in Bali because of tourism. In West Java province, LCC was developed for Sundanese (local) language, dance, and music. Unfortunately, the transformation of local music into school practice failed because music teachers were (and continue to be) educated in Western music and not in their local music forms. The problem was less evident in dance, as local dances have always been part of the curriculum. For the first time, the national curriculum of 1994 had some flexible elements based on Indonesian art forms, which had never worked in music and fine arts, because of misunderstandings and a lack of teachers’ knowledge (Mack, 2004).

As an assessor for accreditation programs, I examined the curriculum of the music programs at the universities in Indonesia. Most music programs only have 2 credit hours for traditional music; the majority is Western music, and the change to Indonesian
indigenous music forms is happening very slowly. The curriculum of the music study program at the Indonesian University of Education in Bandung is an exception, since it contains more hours for traditional Indonesian music forms. In contrast, the dance curriculum focused on local culture, while just only a few credit hours involve other cultures.

Besides being a dance teacher, a national curriculum planner, and an assessor for accreditation for study programs, I am an Indonesian civil servant who has the right to participate in the political process. Nevertheless, under Suharto’s regime, I could only vote for the Golkar Party (Golongan Karya), the government workers’ party, even though there were three parties to choose from. In other words, I did not really have a voice. The opposition parties were the Development Unity Party (PPP) formed by a coalition of Muslim parties, and the Indonesian Democratic Party (PDI) formed by secular and Christian parties. The symbol of Golkar was a blue uniform with a pattern of elm trees and leaves, rice, and cotton that all civil servants had to wear on the 17th of every month when performing the ritual political ceremony for government workers. The 17th, actually only August 17th, has a symbolic meaning for Indonesians because on that day in 1945 Indonesians declared their independence from the Dutch colonizers. The message implies that civil servants in Indonesia should develop a patriotic consciousness in their workforce. The ritual political ceremonies took place like every Monday morning when I was in elementary, middle, and high schools.

At this ceremony, all government workers sang the national anthem while we raised the Indonesian flag, recited the five principles of Pancasila, and recited the civil
servants document, *Korpri* (civil servant of the Republic of Indonesia). We had to demonstrate that we are good civil servants and just silently followed the rules. However, some people who were critical of the Suharto régime quickly felt alienated, and for most of them, jail was the only place to go. As many did, I wanted to protest and sometimes did not attend the ceremonies. The civil servant ceremonies were finally discontinued with the end of General Suharto’s presidency in 1998.

Suharto’s efforts to maintain stability in a uniform system ended in 1998 with a multidimensional crisis of personal, social, political, cultural, and economic problems. Indonesia was hit the hardest by the economic crisis of 1997 in Southeast Asia. There were spectacular and massive riots of students and civil servants all over Indonesia to force Suharto, who served as president for thirty-two years, to step down. There were even increasing separatist conflicts in West Sumatra, South Sulawesi, Aceh, West Java, Irian Jaya, East Timor, Riau, and other areas, demanding independent political and economic power. Internal conflicts took place mainly because the economic development was centralized in Java (Pratikno, 2005). There were ongoing racial tensions between native Indonesians and the Chinese. Internally, the state became weak as a result of regional instability and conflicts between the elites and various armed resistance groups (Alatas, 1997) and due to a widespread corruption and nepotism.

After Suharto stepped down, Bacharuddin Jusuf Habibie who served as Minister of Science and Technology under Suharto, replaced him in 1998. Habibie initialized the major changes of the national policy towards democracy. He conducted the first democratic elections in 1999, and allowed 48 parties to promote themselves to be elected.
Habibie decreed two laws related to decentralization, numbers 22/1999 and 25/1999, to mandate political, economic, and social responsibility in regional autonomy. He also initiated the plebiscite that led to East Timor’s independence in 1999. However, political life in Indonesia was too chaotic in the central, regional, and local governments. This situation became worse because the people had not yet been prepared for change. This period continued without any significant changes under the next two elected presidents, Abdurachman Wahid (Gus Dur) and Megawati Sukarno Putri, (1999-2004).

When my daughter and I left Indonesia in 2003, the country was still debilitated. The leaders who came after Suharto were similarly corrupt. There was an ongoing economic crisis that resulted in an increase in poverty, a rise in crime, violence, and hunger. Furthermore, the power and uniqueness of individuals and cultural differences almost disappeared as a result of the efforts for uniformity during the authoritarian Suharto regime.

The Demand for Educational Changes

Indonesia has attempted to reform its educational system after more than thirty-two years of centralized government and national education. According to the 2005 World Bank report, Indonesian competitors have always been left behind qualitatively, compared with neighboring countries such as Malaysia, Thailand, and the Philippines. Therefore, the current demand for educational changes grows out of various considerations, mainly the needs of competitive citizens, various decentralization efforts, identity issues, and human relations.
Freire (2003), a Brazilian educator and philosopher, argued that education is always a political act. It can be used to maintain the status quo, or to bring about social change. In the Indonesian case, during Suharto’s regime, education was used as a tool to maintain the status quo. Images of uniformity and sameness were nurtured, and nationalism was used to legitimate political power. Education during Suharto’s era may be in concordance with Freire’s ‘banking concept,’ where the teacher is the subject of the learning process, while students are objects or containers that are to be filled by ‘deposits’ of information or knowledge (Freire, 2003, p. 72). The fuller the containers get, the better the teacher is considered to have taught. In contrast to the banking concept, Freire also discussed “problem-posing education” (p. 79), which is designed to help students discuss their thoughts and views of the world explicitly or implicitly and feel like they are masters of their own thinking.

Brodjonegoro (2003), the Director General of Higher Education of the Ministry of National Education, places the nation’s competitiveness along with autonomy and organizational health as basic policies of development in higher education between the years 2003 and 2010. He explains that in order to contribute to the nation’s competitiveness, higher education must be organizationally healthy. Competitiveness of citizens and the nation itself becomes the main educational goal for Indonesia in long-term planning for the years 2005 through 2025. It deals with the needs of power and knowledge in the era of world markets and globalization. Freire’s (2003) problem-posing education should be considered in order to produce competitive citizens, because
competitiveness requires thinking critically, independently, and open-mindedly, and there
must be freedom of thought.

Even if an increasing number of educators and politicians become aware of the
pre-requisites of competitiveness in almost any field, one has to keep in mind that the
process may last even longer than 2025. In a society which is strongly routed in a
hierarchical system, thinking critically, independently, and open-mindedly is a challenge
and extremely difficult to realize. Former feudal and autocratic systems are still seen as
an ideal in the process of teaching and learning. Corruption is an ongoing attitude of the
leaders and administrators in educational institutions. It occurs not only because of low
salaries, but also because of decades-long corrupt habits during the Suharto’s regime. In
fact, Indonesian society is still struggling to achieve its educational goals. Nevertheless,
competitiveness is an urgent matter for Indonesians to attain, no matter how long it may
take them.

Since the year 2001, the Indonesian government attempted to decentralize the
education system. According to Rasyid (2005), a former minister of regional autonomy in
Indonesia (1999-2004), decentralization is a mainstay of democracy. One of the
decentralization efforts has been to redistribute “power from the central government to
local actors and organizations” (Bjork, 2005, p. 1), giving states and districts the
responsibility to develop their own systems. In the efforts for decentralization, the
teachers have to do something differently than what they did in the past top-down system.

According to Bjork (2005), “teachers who had previously functioned as loyal
agents of policy directives were suddenly asked to act as agents of change, constructing
original curricula, shaping instruction to fit the unique needs of their students, and becoming involved in the decision making process in their schools” (p. 3). It is not easy for teachers to change their habits in a short period of time without having the education or training that supports new demands. For example, as Bjork reported in his research in six junior high schools in Malang, East Java, the teachers failed to implement the LCC effectively. When he interviewed them about the training they had received on the LCC, the teachers said that trainers from the central government did not work collaboratively with the participants regarding the materials or modules; rather, they required the teachers to complete an array of forms, such as “an outline of a year long educational program, a weekly time allocation sheet, and an outline of a year academic term” (Bjork, 2005, p. 79).

The LCC that was launched in Indonesia’s national curriculum in 1994 has been required in the decentralization efforts in 2001. The curriculum content was related to local languages or arts and culture (Ministry of National Education, 1994). On the one hand, the LCC for arts and culture is good for students to learn in order to better understand the arts and culture of where they live. On the other hand, this practice can be biased by ethnocentrism or localism.

Decentralization brings with it other new problems. When I conducted a workshop with a team of faculty members from the Indonesia University of Education in one district of West Java province in 2002, we developed modules that were not only useful to fulfill the local content requirement, but also to nurture cross-cultural understanding among the various ethnic groups in Indonesia. We felt that these modules
should indeed serve both purposes. However, a criticism we received from one of the participants was that in their (regional district) decentralization efforts, they were only requiring the teachers to implement the local dance and music. In other words, the participants interpreted the decentralization effort in the workshop as having an ethnocentric bias.

As I stated in the section on ethnicity, Indonesia consists of a huge number of suku. It is rich with cultural productions, including dance, music, poetry, craft, visual arts, and theater from many ethnic groups. However, music and the visual arts taught in the classroom are still too Western-oriented. Educators concerned with the richness of Indonesian music and visual arts have been struggling hard since 1992 to incorporate Indonesian culture into the curriculum content because Indonesia’s national identity has been biased by Westernized forms of music and visual arts. Mack (2001) asked the music teachers, “Why is your curriculum content in Indonesia based on Western music?” (p. 11). The teachers’ answer was ironically related to national identity concerns. Indonesia has many different forms and styles of music; therefore choosing one particular style as representing national identity would be an offense to the others. Importing one from outside, however, would not offend any particular ethnic group. Besides, some of the above-mentioned Dutch-educated intellectuals of the independence movement had created patriotic songs in the style of Western tonal music (Mack, 2001, pp. 1-27). These patriotic songs are still part of the curriculum content of music education in Indonesian schools.
The demand for educational change addresses the improvement of people’s attitudes of human relations. Yayah Kisbiyah (2000), one of the board members of Muhammadiyah, the largest Muslim organization in Indonesia, promotes an educational system that appreciates pluralism. She believes that good human relationships and tolerance are important and explains, “we already live in a pluralistic society, but we don’t fully understand how to live together with cultural differences, including religion, ethnicity, and social class” (p. 153). She argues that prejudice between religious groups, ethnicities, and races (in particular, the indigenous and Chinese-Indonesians) has led to many conflicts. To improve these conflicts and avoid prejudice, she collaborated with arts educators in the Islamic Muhammadiyah schools to teach arts from diverse ethnicities.

Syamsul Ma’arif (2005), a faculty member in the State Institute of Islam in Semarang, has a similar desire to integrate people of different religions and have them live together harmoniously in Indonesia. In his book, *Pendidikan Pluralisme di Indonesia* [Pluralist Education in Indonesia], Ma’arif proposes that religious education should not only involve studying one’s own religion, but also learning about other religions. In this way, we can have an understanding of other people’s beliefs: “We have a desire for mutual respect, tolerance, and living together in peace” (Ma’arif, 2005, p. vii). Focusing only on one’s own religion increases prejudice toward others. Therefore, Ma’arif urges changing the curriculum content in religious education in Indonesian schools.

In summary, education in Indonesia is facing various demands, such as becoming competitive citizens, reforming decentralization and national identity bias, and building
human relations. In order for Indonesians to be able to actively participate in democracy and globalization, it is imperative to develop multicultural education in Indonesia.

Multiculturalism in Indonesia

In their book, *Multiculturalism in Asia*, Kymlicka and He (2005) note some difficulties in applying Western models of multiculturalism to the Asian context. Besides the fact that the legacy of colonialism in Indonesia is different than that in the West, they argue that the Western notion of multiculturalism deals with minority rights, including the rights of indigenous peoples, national minorities, and immigrants. Bowen (2005) supports Kymlicka and He’s (2005) notion about minority rights. In the case of Indonesia, he examines a national minority in Aceh, North Sumatra. He explains that the expansion of the Javanese people to Aceh resulted in the Acehnese becoming the minority, even though the Acehnese were the indigenous people. However, I believe that Bowen has misinterpreted the case of the Acehnese becoming a minority. If he were right, this phenomenon would apply to almost every ethnic group in Indonesia.

It is important to be reminded that by its very nature, Indonesia has been a multi-ethnic country with ethnic groups of very different sizes since its beginnings. For example, there are ethnic groups in mountain areas of Kalimantan of only a few hundred people, and there are the Sundanese in West Java with approximately 20 million people. The Indonesians acknowledged this reality from the very beginning, and therefore they never talk about minorities or majorities in terms of equal rights as it has been the case in North America. A problem that arose along with Indonesian nation building under
Sukarno was that the Javanese people became prominent during the national development, because the center of the nation’s development has been and still is Java. However, this meant that members from other ethnic groups did not have much opportunity to participate in nation building.

When Suharto came to power, as we know, he started to promote stability and unity. One of his main programs was transmigration, which involved moving citizens from the overpopulated island of Java to less-populated areas outside of Java. In this process, those who moved into the new settlements cultivated and developed the new regions. Conflicting interests between local indigenous people and the Javanese who moved in led to political tension. Conflicts did not only arise because of differing religious beliefs, but also questions of political power. The Aceh case also had to do with economics, because the rich oil fields of Aceh were exploited by the central government and the Acehnese did not receive any reasonable compensation. In other words, there was never a problem of ethnic groups becoming minorities; the problem had to do with political, economic, and sometimes religious considerations.

Pluralism

Like America’s credo, E Pluribus Unum -- ‘Out of Many, One,’-- the Indonesian national credo since the 1920s has been Bhineka Tunggal Ika, ‘Unity in Diversity.’ This credo addresses diversity issues that include SARA, Suku (ethnicity), Agama (religion), Ras (race), and Antar Golongan (intergroup or classes). However, SARA became politically a sensitive issue, which Suharto’s New Order regime disregarded (Bowen,
In 2005; Farhadian, 2005). Instead, Suharto attempted to establish nationalism by nurturing a patriotic consciousness. In this fashion, he instituted his political power of uniformity, while denying diversity. Consequently, in the late 1990s the country experienced heightening economic crisis, as well as ethnic and religious conflicts. Bertrand (2004) argues that the institutionalization of Indonesia’s national model under Suharto’s New Order had a direct impact on these conflicts.

Based on one type of political movement of state and nation, Bernard (2004) explains:

State elites undertake ‘nation building’ efforts to create common bonds, foster common values, or craft a common culture that defines a new nation coincident with existing state boundaries. This form of state nationalism attempts to eliminate bonds to a prior national or ethnic group and to form new loyalties to the state based on membership of a new nation….These bonds can be traced to cultural characteristics, adherence to a particular religion, native languages, common histories, or political principles…. (p. 16)

On the one hand Suharto worked to eliminate Indonesians’ bonds to a prior national or ethnic group. On the other hand, in his political practice, he put forth the Javanese elite and Islamic belief as a common bond for Indonesia. As a consequence, ethnic groups that were dissatisfied with Suharto’s regime sought to reduce the centralization of power held by those dominant Javanese elites. There were also conflicts that involved religious groups due to increasing prejudice (Kisbiyah, 2000; Ma’arif, 2005), in particular, between Christians and Muslims, or even among Muslims themselves. Farhadian (2005) notes that “Muslims suspected Christians of Christianization, while the Christians accused Muslims of attempting to create an Islamic State” (p. xii).
As I already mentioned in another context earlier in this section, one of the policies of Indonesia’s national model that led to ethnic and religious conflicts was transmigration, the expansion of people from overpopulated areas such as Java, Bali, and Madura to less populated islands such as Kalimantan, Sumatra, Sulawesi, Maluku, and Irian Jaya. Intersections between indigenous peoples in the new land, less-populated areas, and new expansions especially of Muslims caused cultural and religious tensions. The indigenous people preferred to preserve their ancestors’ traditional lifestyles or their Christian upbringing and tried to resist any kind of change. These tensions are evident even today.

Ahmad Najib Burhani (2004)\(^5\) writes critically in his article, “Exclusivism and Multiculturalism in Islamic Society,” about why the majority of Indonesia’s population, both Muslim and non Muslim, reject the \textit{Shari’ah} (Islamic law). He examined electoral political parties in 2004, among them the Crescent Star Party (PBB), which promoted \textit{Shari’ah} as the law of the land. Finally, this party that had promoted \textit{Shari’ah} gained less than three percent of the votes and failed to pass the electoral threshold. Burhani (2004) argues that the majority of Muslims in Indonesia are nominal Muslims, who are not eager to accept ‘total’ Islam in their daily lives. In contrast, the proponents of \textit{Shari’ah} view Islam as only one Islam – a monolithic entity. Burhani states, “it is imperative to disseminate Islamic multiculturalism …, the perception of Islam as a blessing for all creatures.” In other words, Burhani seems to advocate pluralism to accept multiple ways

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of life in Indonesia’s Islam. But whether this includes really different positions and beliefs is not clear.

Burhani (2004) promotes multiculturalism by arguing against a single set of thoughts and values, and for multiple ways and differences. Islam in Indonesia is mixed with the various local cultures and traditions and various religions which came before Islam, such as Hinduism and Buddhism. This mixed religious consciousness can still be seen in various ritual and social events that involve dance, music, and theater all over the country. In *Islamic Syncretism in Indonesia*, Brakel (1995) examines how Indonesian Islam is actually a blending, combining, or reconciling of different religions. Brakel also states, “Today, since branches of every main religion have intersected with others, each faith in fact represents a kind of syncretism” (p. 1). This means not only Islamic syncretism, but also Christian syncretism. For example, when I conducted research in Banten and Cirebon, West Java in 1999, Muslims in both places still conducted the annual ritual harvest ceremony or a community festival, presenting music and dance to celebrate the rice goddess, Dewi Sri. At the same time, they marked the death of Muslim teachers as well as village ancestors.

With regard to gender, Suharto’s regime created a homogeneous and hegemonic image of womanhood as a representation of motherhood (Dzuhayatin, 2001). Dzuhayatin examined the values of upper-middle class aristocratic Javanese society (*ningrat* and *priyayi*) mixed with Dutch and Islamic rules that recognize women only as housewives. According to conservative Islamic beliefs, gender inequality between men and women is viewed as ‘natural’ and inevitable. As Dzuhayatin states, under Suharto’s New Order,
which perpetuated Islamic beliefs, “women faced a dilemma as to how to balance their
desire to engage in public life with restrictive, natural roles assigned them by the state”
(p. 265). In this new Indonesian context, this dilemma challenges women to have rights
of self-representation and to choose heterogeneous expressions of themselves.

Indonesia’s national model or nationalism should not be viewed as homogeneous
and uniform; rather, nationalism in the new Indonesian context should value pluralism
and heterogeneity. According to Childs and Williams (1997), “the nation is not a
homogeneous but a heterogeneous, changeable grouping, … and hybridized at its every
contact with the Other (over)lapping its borders” (p. 140). In this sense, the term ‘national
culture’ in the new Indonesia should refer to heterogeneous, changeable, hybridized, and
multicultural concepts.

*Democracy and Globalization*

After Suharto stepped down in 1998, Indonesia attempted to become more
democratic to participate in globalization. According to Antlov (2005), “late capitalism is
characterized by free-floating financial exchanges and sophisticated technologies. The
autonomy of the nation state is being eroded through forces of the market and the
demands of emerging global cultures” (p. 233). International organizations such as the
United Nations and the World Bank have supported Indonesia to implement democracy
and create equality and social justice through decentralization. The Indonesian
government is trying to distribute equal power between national, regional, and local
actors. International organizations are concerned with providing equal opportunities to women, the poor, and the disadvantaged so that they can have access to education.

To further implement decentralization, Bambang Sudibyo, Minister of National Education in President Susilo Bambang Yudoyos cabinet (2005-2009), provided guidelines for all education management levels in carrying out the national education development activities. In the Strategic Plan of the Ministry of National Education (Renstra MoNE) for 2005-2009, the guidelines outline three major policies of national education development in Indonesia: (a) equity and expansion of educational access; (b) improvement of quality, relevance, and competitiveness; and (c) strengthening of governance, accountability, and public image by all educational leaders as well as personnel at both central and regional levels. These policies are embedded in a whole level of education from early childhood, basic education, secondary education, and up to higher education, as well as non-formal education programs and quality improvement programs for teachers and other educational personnel. This strategic plan envisions a long-term goal: “the establishment of a modern Indonesian nation-state which is safe, peaceful, just, democratic, and prosperous, upholding the values of humanity, independence, and unity based on Pancasila, the state ideology and the 1945 constitution” (Renstra MoNE, 2005, p. 11). In the future, education in Indonesia is expected to prepare intellectual and competitive citizens who can participate actively and effectively in democracy and globalization. This goal should be supported by a democratic system as well.
Unfortunately, in a democratic society, we often find problems of stereotyping, prejudice, and discrimination. According to American journalist Lippmann (1922), a stereotype is “pictures in our heads of the people” (cited in Stangor, 2000 & Hinton, 2000). These pictures may be constructed by the person or may come from their culture. Emphasizing culture, Lippmann claimed that “the stereotypes we construct are essentially false, criticizing both the process of producing them and their contents” (in Hinton, 2000, p. 9). Yet, Stangor (2000) pointed out that stereotype deals with “beliefs about the characteristics of groups of individuals” (p. 5) … “[that] color our perception and judgments of others” (p. 11). Stereotypes dominate our perceptions so that we view other cultures in stereotypical ways. Even though democracy in the U.S. is already in place, multicultural education proponents struggle against stereotypes and myths, prejudice, and discrimination, because these affect inequality and injustice in schools and society. For example, Pang, Kiang, and Pak (2004) reported in their research that Asian Pacific American (APA) students often experienced a biased educational and social system because they were labeled ‘model minorities’ who seemed to look and act alike.

In an email communication, King-Cavin revealed to me her opinion about stereotypes in connection with multicultural education. She wrote,

… Some people have [made] negative comments about multicultural education. I was wondering if you will reveal those opinions. As an educator, I want to teach about other cultures, but I do not want to teach stereotypes. Because of the lack of information that we have about people, in this country many times we rely on what has readily been presented to us through the media or through limited contact with another group. Sometimes we do not even know what we do not know. That is the real danger. When we accept myths or untruths as fact, we pass them on as truths. This is comforting for some people because if reinforces negative feelings they have about others and does not challenge their standing in
society. Some people who have disagreed with the multicultural approach have disliked it because, without a deep understanding of the worldview of a group of people, old stereotypes become truths… (September 28, 2006)

When researching multicultural education, one always encounters stereotypes and myths. According to King-Cavin, stereotypes and myths are inaccurate, and they result in negative feelings. King-Cavin also gave an example of how an art teacher in the United States teaches the art of other cultures, but views the content based on his/her own perspective in stereotypical ways.

The democratic process in Indonesia demands that individuals have their own rights and freedoms to employ equal power, have access to education, and eliminate stereotypes and myths, prejudice, and discrimination. Stengel (2004), Director of the Foundation for Excellence in Education (Yayasan Pendidikan Luhur), offers the ideas of ‘world-mindedness’ or ‘global thinking,’ the ability to think critically and independently. In opposition to ‘global thinking’ is ‘provincial thinking.’ Stengel explains:

Provincial thinking focuses on the needs and interests of ourselves and our community. From this point of view, we distrust people from other communities and our efforts are aimed at protecting ourselves and our possessions. We close our minds to what we don’t know because it threatens our way of life, and we think, our very existence. There are plenty of examples of this kind of thinking throughout history where people act with kindness and respect members of their own group, but treat others as less than human. (Stengel, 2004, p. 1)

Provincial thinking can lead people to draw stereotypes. People may judge others, isolating certain characteristics or images of certain groups. People will also close their minds and may not share their interests or communicate with people from different ethnicities or religions than their own, because they fear that those groups will influence
their beliefs with their negative thinking or inappropriate attitudes and behaviors. Even though stereotypes and myths are false, they sometimes become part of a belief system. To avoid prejudice and discrimination caused by stereotyping and to build human relations, individuals need to engage in global thinking and world-mindedness, which are imperative in a democratic society.

Indonesia is still signified by many obstacles, including the impact of media, and dichotomy of the East and the West. The media plays an important role to influence people in creating stereotypes. One may say that the almost magical nature of television is one of the main producers of stereotypes and fantasies. If something has been presented on TV, people take it for granted and accept it as fact, without any critical thinking. In this fashion, television could help enormously in extinguishing stereotypes and prejudices instead of creating them. However, this can only happen if the responsible persons regard television as a medium of education and less as a commercial tool.

Dichotomy between the East and the West is an ongoing problem in Indonesia, especially with regard to social interactions. The most popular and incorrect dichotomy is the individualistic and egoistic Westerner on the one side and the collective, always socially harmonious thinking Indonesian (or Asian) on the other. However, based on my experiences when I lived in the village of Parakan, a traditional community, and when I was involved in a non-governmental organization or a group in Bandung, a capital city of West Java, the situation was different. One needs only a short period of life experience in both cultural realms to see that real collective thinking in Indonesia takes place only within the family and the traditional community. In modern Indonesian society, when
people gather to create a union as an organization or a club for a special purpose, it is usually a matter of time before they split up because of animosity and hidden attempts to seek personal advantage from the union.

With regard to pluralism and the demands of democracy and globalization, I believe that the model of multicultural education developed in the United States can serve to address multicultural issues in Indonesia. Multiculturalism can also address competitiveness among Indonesians as they pursue the necessary knowledge and skills to function in ethnic cultures within Indonesia as well as in cultures within other nations.

Summary

Indonesia consists of a large number of ethnic groups with different customs and traditions, languages, religions, and cultures. However, until 1998, the country had an authoritarian government. The autocratic president, Suharto, legitimated ‘nationalism’ and national education to maintain the status quo. The concept of nationalism has been biased by uniformity, avoiding diversity and affirming homogeneity. This has led to heightening ethnic and religious conflicts. Education in the new Indonesian context is facing various demands, such as becoming competitive citizens, reforming decentralization and national identity bias, and building human relations.

Kymlica and He (2005) challenged multiculturalism in Asia based on the Western notion to examine minorities. Yet, the legacy of colonialism in Indonesia, where the European colonizers eventually departed, is different from that of the United States, where the European colonizers stayed and formed a new nation. Therefore, in this study I
explored multiculturalism in Indonesia in connection with the values of pluralism, democracy, and globalization. I strongly hope that individuals in the new Indonesian context have self-identification, knowledge, skills, attitudes, and behaviors to be able to live in a multiethnic society and participate in social change.